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PERFORMANCE METRICS FOR ALGORITHMIC
TRADERS
DALE W.R. ROSENTHAL
Abstract. Portfolio traders may split large orders into smaller orders
scheduled over time to reduce price impact. Since handling many orders
is cumbersome, these smaller orders are often traded in an automated
(“algorithmic”) manner. We propose metrics using these orders to help
measure various trading-related skills with low noise. Managers may
use these metrics to assess how separate parts of the trading process
contribute execution, market timing, and order scheduling skills versus
luck. These metrics could save 4 basis points in cost per trade yielding
a 15% reduction in expenses and saving $7.3 billion annually for US-
domiciled equity mutual funds alone. The metrics also allow recovery of
parameters for a price impact model with lasting and ephemeral effects.
Some metrics may help evaluate external intermediaries, test for possible
front-running, and indicate sloppy or overly passive trading.
JEL: G12, G14, G23, G24
1. Introduction
Traders with a portfolio of orders often split and execute those orders
across time to hide alpha or reduce execution costs in light of market liquid-
ity. Berke (2010) estimates that over 30% of volume is the result of order
splitting. McPartland (2010) estimated that $13.4 billion would be spent
on trading infrastructure globally in 2010. Since the use of order splitting,
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smart order routing, and other algorithmic trading techniques is becoming
widespread, we can expect that a significant portion of spending on trading
infrastructure is for such tools. Indeed, Honore´ (2009) estimated US finan-
cial firms would spend $1 billion on smart order routing alone (to access
superior prices) in 2010. For such a large amount of money spent, man-
agers must know the value of high-speed execution systems, market timing
models, and order schedulers.
In particular, we seek to distinguish if good trading performance is due
to execution skill, short-term market timing ability, skillful scheduling of
orders, or just luck. This article proposes metrics to help portfolio managers
measure these skills and reduce the noise of these measurements.
Significant savings may be achieved by application of the metrics we pro-
pose. In 2010, the assets under management in equity and hybrid mutual
funds was about $5.6 trillion in the US with the US comprising 48% of the
world market, according to the Investment Company Institute. Those funds
had about 64% turnover annually and expense ratios of 0.87% for equity
funds and 0.84% for hybrid funds. Simulation results with the proposed
metrics show possible savings of 2 basis points per trade for both trading
and order scheduling skills (a total of 8 bp from entry to exit of a position).
Given these figures, a typical fund could save 13 basis points per year. Across
US-domiciled equity mutual funds, expenses could thus be reduced by al-
most 15% leading to a savings of $7.3 billion annually.1 One could expect
even greater savings for pension funds and insurance companies.
High-speed smart order routing and execution management systems (EMS)
were ushered in by Reg NMS (in the US) and the MiFID directive (in the
EU). Reg NMS’s demand that each order be provided “best execution” could
1Bond funds and internationally-domiciled equity funds would also benefit from the metrics
proposed here; however, the benefit to those funds is more difficult to assess.
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be interpreted as the right to challenge any trade which did not achieve the
best price aross all venues at that time. While Reg NMS allows for other in-
terpretations of best execution, a best-price interpretation is the most likely
for small orders where liquidity is not a concern. If we expand the time
window of comparison, best execution would likely imply achieving a price
close to that achieved by others trading at about the same time. This com-
parison is one of the proposed metrics. Heston et al. (2010) suggested such a
measure relates to spreads and impact incurred only by an individual trader;
that suggestion is shown to be correct.
Under Reg NMS, larger orders might be challenged as being too large
to be executed at one time. This issue is typically handled by an order
management system (OMS) or trading engine which schedules (i.e. splits)
orders across time. There are many reasons to split the execution of large
orders. Splitting an order to hide alpha was studied by Kyle (1985). Bert-
simas and Lo (1998) examined order splitting to optimize execution costs.
Almgren and Chriss (2001) extended this to reduce the mean-variance cost
of trading and to create the idea of an efficient execution frontier. Engle and
Ferstenberg (2007) showed that combining the portfolio and order schedul-
ing optimization yields a better optimal portfolio. The failure to do so may
explain why portfolios frequently underperform the Sharpe ratios suggested
by standard portfolio optimizations. Therefore, the order scheduling opti-
mization must be an integral part of portfolio optimization if investment
managers are to get useful forecasts of Sharpe ratios. Metrics proposed here
may help investment managers by offering methods to estimate parameters
needed to combine the order splitting and investment optimizations.
When markets are stagnant and returns are low, small transactions costs
may consume a large fraction of returns or, even worse, result in negative
returns. For large endowments, pension funds, retirement plans, and mutual
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funds, these problems are particularly acute; the large portfolio trades they
execute may greatly strain market liquidity. Given the amount of money
involved and the liquidity strain, these portfolio trades must be handled with
the utmost skill and care: poor executions, lousy market timing, or careless
order scheduling may be very costly. Indeed, a cross-sectional comparison of
mutual fund performance by Fama and French (2010) shows that costs tend
to flow through to lower returns; however, they along with Puckett and Yan
(2011) also find that some funds have persistent outperformance. Puckett
and Yan relate this outperformance to trading skill.
We propose metrics which help portfolio managers measure various trad-
ing skills by isolating the effect of luck on a set of trades. Some metrics are
resistant to gaming and may be used to evaluate external traders. Two of
the metrics may even detect some basic forms of front-running or “trading
alongside.” Finally, many of the metrics here may be taken in isolation;
this allows academics and policy makers to study various aspects of market
quality across venues or time.
2. Developing the Metrics: Considering Counterfactuals
A rich literature exists on investment performance metrics. Yet despite
the increasing focus on trading, less work has been done on trading per-
formance metrics. We keep in mind the helpful guidelines set by Lehmann
(2003) and develop the metrics by asking counterfactual questions. In this
way, our reasoning is similar to that of another metric, the implementa-
tion shortfall of Perold (1988). The implementation shortfall compares the
average price achieved plus an estimate of opportunity costs to the initial
portfolio price. The metrics are therefore complementary to the implemen-
tation shortfall. The set of questions also results in many of the metrics
decomposing overall trading performance.
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2.1. Terminology. To discuss order splitting, we need clear terminology.
I follow Engle and Ferstenberg (2007) and call the order which is split the
parent order ; the orders generated by splitting I call child orders. A set of
parent orders executed together constitute a portfolio order.
I refer to metrics being suitable for internal or external use in the sense of
Lehmann (2003). Internal use presumes a performance auditor who does not
seek to distort or game metrics and who knows all investment and trading
decisions including actions considered but not taken. External use requires
that an auditor know only the investment decision and executions; however,
metrics for external use must be resistant to gaming.
Since the number of child orders generated by order scheduling may be
large, the trading process is often automated. Algorithmic trading is the
automated, often research-driven, creation and management of orders. Our
concern is mostly large algorithmically-traded portfolio orders with parent
orders split into many child orders. We examine child orders and executions
across instruments and days by splitting time into bins. While bins are
contiguous, their lengths of time may vary. Thus we can choose shorter bins
when volume or volatility is typically higher.
2.2. Parent Order Metrics. The first set of metrics are the parent order
metrics which ask the following questions:
• What if we began trading when somebody external knew of our order?
• What was the marginal (or incremental) cost of our last trade?
• What would the profit be for providing liquidity to that last trade?
• What is the lasting effect our trading had on prices?
• How much worse did we do than that lasting effect on prices?
The answers to these questions give us the parent order metrics which
decompose trading effects at an instrument level. We can answer the last
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three questions by examining a period after trading: a parent order traded
over an entire day might use the following day for comparison.
Information leakage measures the instrument’s value drift between when
orders were revealed (perhaps via bidding for the portfolio of orders) and
when those orders began to be traded. An order revealed, even partially, for
pricing may be front run. This metric allows testing if order information is
leaking to the market.
Incremental impact measures the difference between the price at trading
end and the average execution price. That difference is the incremental effect
of additional trading on the average price. If there were no price impact due
to trading, this quantity would have expectation 0.
Decaying impact is the difference between the instrument price at the
end of trading and some fair price in the next period; since some impact
decays after trading, this measures the decay of non-temporary price impact
(realized implementation shortfall and incremental impact) over the post-
trading period. This is a proxy for what a market maker would earn by
providing liquidity for the last scheduled orders.2
Permanent impact is the difference between the price at the start of trad-
ing and the next period’s fair price; this measures the lasting price change.
To the extent a parent order contains economic information, we should be-
lieve that E(PI) > 0. Noise traders and liquidity providers may have ex-
pectationally negative permanent impact.
Adverse selection is the difference between the implementation shortfall
and the next period’s fair price; this is the cost which dissipates over the
2A market maker providing liquidity effectively trades against their client at the end of
trading. For example, a client making a large purchase might increase the price of a
security. A market maker could then provide liquidity or “facilitate” the trade by selling
short to the client for the last order. This might prevent the client from pushing prices
higher and thus is sometimes referred to as “price improvement.” Nonetheless, the market
maker is then short a security which is likely to decline in price. Some clients might view
this as an acceptable risk-shifting agreement; others are not so sanguine.
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next period. Thus this includes both price impact and poor child order
execution. Microstructure models suggest such costs are due in part to
market maker concerns about adverse selection. Without adverse selection,
we would expect a trading period fair price to be close to the next-period
fair price.
2.3. Intertemporal Metrics. The second set of metrics use individual exe-
cutions to build intertemporal metrics which answer the following questions:
• What if each child order had been filled at a fair price?
• What if each child order had been filled when it was scheduled?
• What if each child order were scheduled to match the typical distri-
bution of volume over time?
• What if each child order were scheduled to match the actual distri-
bution of volume over time?
These intertemporal metrics measure various skills and noise across time.
They do so by decomposing parent order performance by looking at child
orders and executions in the context of their respective time bins. The
first three metrics (trading, fill time, and ordertiming shortfalls) are the
most informative and correspond to separate decisions about how to trade,
how patient to be with limit orders or unsent trades, and how to schedule
child orders. These metrics also let us see if particular times of day are
troublesome.
Trading shortfall compares our average execution price in each bin to
a fair price for that bin. Thus the main determinant of trading shortfall
should be execution skill. This should reduce much of the noise in trading
performance and allow us to see execution quality more clearly. If we could
consistently achieve superior executions, we would expect a negative trading
shortfall. Algorithmic traders optimizing execution strategies should see the
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effects of those changes manifested in trading shortfall. The performance of
an EMS configured to execute trades in a short window of time would be
encapsulated by this metric.
Fill time shortfall measures the cost of foregoing immediate execution of
child orders, i.e. the cost of diverging from our execution plan. An EMS
or OMS configured to let orders sit passively in hopes of better prices is
essentially timing the market over a short horizon; thus the fill time shortfall
attempts to assess short-term market timing skill. This metric encapsulates
the “strategy deviations” discussed by Kissell and Malamut (2005), i.e. the
benefit of sacrificing execution immediacy for price sensitivity.
Order timing shortfall measures the cost of not trading according to the
average distribution of volume over time. A negative shortfall suggests a
strategy deviates from trading in line with expected volume when prices are
advantageous. The performance of an OMS, trading engine, or algorithmic
trader creating order schedules would be encapsulated by the order timing
shortfall. This metric can also be seen as capturing the performance of a
chosen point on the efficient frontier of trading (i.e. a chosen order schedule).
Volume shortfall measures the cost of volume distribution variation or
noise. This is done by comparing the cost of executing orders following
the average versus the actual volume distribution. Since the average volume
distribution is an (unconditional) expectation, we expect this metric to have
mean 0 (as is true for most noise terms).
Finally, the perfect VWAP shortfall measures the difference between the
price at the start of trading and a basic volume-weighted average price
(VWAP) strategy of splitting orders according to the average volume dis-
tribution. This does not answer one of the above questions — since it is
needed merely for the definition of the metrics.
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3. Mathematically Defining the Metrics
All decompositions assume we have no alpha or have pre-subtracted it.3
We also assume that, over short to intermediate time frames, the VWAP
is fair (i.e. unbeatable on average without alpha). From experience and
discussions with practitioners, this seems reasonable: No practitioners con-
sulted thought VWAP could be beat without alpha. Opiela (2006) quotes a
practitioner who found various trading algorithms missed VWAP by 1/4 of a
cent (about 1/2 bp) and that this is consistent with performance claimed by
other trading algorithm vendors. We later prove that, absent alpha, VWAP
is a fair price and use this to derive some basic asymptotic properties.
To rigorously define these ideas, we say that trading starts at time t = 0,
ends at time t = T , and:
q, q˜ = signed ordered, executed amount (e.g. shares);
p−, pt = price at first desire to trade, price at time t;
p¯T , pˇ+ = average fill price, next-period fair price.
3.1. Defining the Parent Order Metrics. The parent order metrics offer
more insight into how well a parent order was traded beyond what the
realized implementation shortfall measures. These metrics are defined for a
parent order but examining them at a portfolio order level reduces noise.
To recap: Information leakage (IL) is the price change from order revela-
tion to trading start. Incremental impact (II) compares the average price to
the price at trading end. Decaying impact (DI) compares the price at trad-
ing end to the next-period fair price. Permanent impact (PI) compares the
starting price to the next-day fair price. Adverse selection (AS) compares
the average price to the next-period fair price. Table 1 gives the definitions
3If we expect prices to increase by 4 basis points over the period, a purchase with an
implementation shortfall of 10 basis points should only explain 6 basis points of shortfall.
However, a sale should explain 14 basis points of shortfall.
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of these metrics while Figure 1 illustrates them. Note that they yield two
equalities for the realized implementation shortfall RIS = q˜(p¯T − p0) of
Perold (1988):
RIS = PI +AS = PI +DI − II.(1)
The metrics are summarized in Table 1.
Metric Definition Concept
Information Leakage (IL) q(p0 − p−) Pre-trade price drift
Incremental Impact (II) q˜(pT − p¯T ) Marginal cost of last trade
Decaying Impact (DI) q˜(pT − pˇ+) Profit of providing liquidity
Permanent Impact (PI) q˜(pˇ+ − p0) Information dissemination cost
Adverse Selection (AS) q˜(p¯T − pˇ+) Average price vs post-trade.
Table 1. Definitions and concepts for parent order metrics.
The realized implementation shortfall, RIS = q˜(p¯T − p0),
may be composed of these metrics via RIS = PI + AS =
PI +DI − II.
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Figure 1. Price versus time with parent order metrics.
Dashed lines show our average fill price and the next-period
fair price.
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3.2. Defining the Intertemporal Metrics. For more detail, we analyze
child order executions. This lets us answer how much of a parent order’s
metrics (from the preceding subsection) are due to luck versus different skills.
One caveat bears mentioning, however: While these metrics are defined on
a parent order level, care should be taken if they are examined below the
portfolio order level. Focusing on one securitiy in isolation may miss the
interaction of how parent orders across the portfolio of orders are scheduled
or traded. For example, a long-short portfolio might schedule its technology
buys and sells to stay balanced throughout the trading period.
To do these analyses, the trading period is partitioned into “bins” to
define the decompositions.4 As in the preceding subsection, we use a “fair”
price to assess execution quality — although we now do so for each time
bin. We then compare how we would have done had we (i) achieved fair bin
prices; (ii) executed all child orders when scheduled; (iii) traded in line with
the expected volume distribution; and (iv) predicted volumes correctly.
This more detailed decomposition requires more notation:
qj = child order quantity in bin j (q =
∑
j qj);
q˜j = child order quantity filled in bin j (q˜ =
∑
j q˜j);
Vj , V¯j = realized, average volume in bin j (V =
∑
j Vj);
Dj , D¯j = realized, average fraction of period volume in bin j;
pˇj = fair price in bin j; and,
p¯j = realized average price in bin j.
We again consider the realized part of the implementation shortfall of a
security, RIS =
∑
j q˜j p¯j − q˜p0. We take no position on whether this is an
appropriate execution benchmark nor does this choice affect decomposition
definitions.5 For a benchmark price of the starting price, p0, this is the
4The decompositions could also be defined using kernel estimators.
5Other possible benchmarks include VWAP and auction (open/close) prices.
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same as
∑
s κbs|qs| in Lehmann (2003). We then decompose the realized
implementation shortfall:
RIS =
∑
j
q˜j(p¯j − pˇj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Trading Shortfall
+
∑
j
(q˜j − q˜ qj
q
)pˇj︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fill Time Shortfall
+
∑
j
q˜(
qj
q
− D¯j)pˇj︸ ︷︷ ︸
Order Timing Shortfall
+
+
∑
j
q˜(D¯j −Dj)pˇj︸ ︷︷ ︸
Volume Shortfall
+
∑
j
q˜(Dj pˇj − p0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Perfect VWAP Shortfall
(2)
Recapping these definitions: Trading Shortfall (TS) measures how we do
in each bin versus fair prices for those bins. Fill time shortfall (FTS) mea-
sures the cost of the realized versus desired execution timing.6 Order timing
shortfall (OTS) measures the cost of executing following the desired order
schedule versus the average volume distribution. Volume shortfall (V S)
measures the cost due to volume distribution noise by comparing the cost
of executing orders following the average versus the actual volume distribu-
tion. Perfect VWAP shortfall (PV S) measures the difference between using
a VWAP benchmark and the initial price; this is needed to define the other
metrics. Apart from the trading shortfall, the intertemporal metrics use the
fair price in each time bin (since that price is independent of trading skill).
Since these metrics are part of a decomposition, they are likely to be
inter-dependent (except for the volume shortfall which, by construction, is
orthogonal to the other metrics). However, the trading shortfall, fill time
shortfall, and order timing shortfall all correspond to products or decisions
made on a trading desk. EMS products such as Morgan Stanley’s SORT,
and Goldman Sachs’s Sigma X would affect the trading shortfall. They
could also affect the fill time shortfall if they were allowed to let orders sit
6We use qj/q for the desired execution timing distribution. This assumes orders are sent
when we desire executions.
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for more than a short period of time. OMS and trading engine products such
as Morgan Stanley’s Benchmark Execution Strategies (BXS) and Goldman
Sachs’s Algorithmic Trading (GSAT) would affect the order timing shortfall.
4. Analysis: Moments, Error, and Parameter Estimation
To explore the meaning and use of these metrics, we need a fair price for
each bin and a price impact model. Until now, we have used VWAP as a
fair price without justification. We now justify that usage so that we may
check our intuition and see how the metrics perform.
4.1. Fair Price for Comparison. Since a fair price should not be beatable
on average, a fair guess would be to use VWAP. To show this qualifies as
a fair price, we begin with a painless proof. We then show that attaining
VWAP may be difficult.
Proposition 1 (VWAP is Fair). Assume the price impact of trading is
arbitrage-free as in Huberman and Stanzl (2004); we have no alpha; and,
VWAP is measured with pre-specified begin and end times which coincide
with the period of trading. Then, a trader cannot expect to beat VWAP.
Proof. By Huberman and Stanzl, one trader cannot beat their average price
nor expect to make quasi-arbitrage profits.
Two traders active over the trading period cannot beat their average
prices nor make arbitrage profits knowing only their own trades (implied
by “no alpha”). Thus they cannot expect to beat the other’s average price.
Since VWAP is a trade-size-weighted average of unbeatable prices, neither
trader can expect to beat VWAP.
Finally, assume k traders cannot beat VWAP without alpha. For k + 1
traders, the k+1-st trader cannot make arbitrage profits nor beat the average
price of the first k traders without alpha. None of the first k traders can make
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arbitrage profits nor beat the average price of the k + 1-st trader without
alpha. Since none of the traders can expect to beat another’s average price,
none can expect to beat VWAP. 
Corollary 1 (VWAP May Be Unattainable). Under the setup for Proposi-
tion 1: Suppose one or more traders have alpha while the others do not. In
that case, the traders without alpha should expect to do worse than VWAP.
The proof is obvious given the proposition. From here forward, we assume
a fair price pˇj is the bin j VWAP and pˇ+ is the post-trading period VWAP.
4.2. Dynamics. We use a model with three types of price impact: perma-
nent, decaying (to 0), and temporary (affecting only the generating trade).
These are parameterized by Greek letters pi, δ, and (τ, φ).
As in Almgren and Chriss (2001) and Obizhaeva and Wang (2006), we
assume continuous trading at a rate q˜j/tj within a bin j. Trading induces
permanent impact (pi) linear in quantity and decaying impact (δ) decreasing
geometrically from an initial impact linear in quantity. Temporary impact
(τ) is linear in the trading rate plus a fixed fee (φ) per trade.7 We can then
write the volume and price evolution equations:
Vj = νj + |q˜j | νj indep∼ (µνj , σ2νj ) νj > 0(3)
pj+1,0 = p0 +
j∑
k=1
[
σp,kZk + piq˜k︸︷︷︸
permanent
+ δj+1−kq˜k︸ ︷︷ ︸
decaying
]
Zk
iid∼ (0, 1)(4)
p¯j = p0 +
j∑
k=1
[
σp,kZk + piq˜k︸︷︷︸
permanent
+ δj+1−kq˜k︸ ︷︷ ︸
decaying
]
+ τ
q˜j
tj
+ φ sgn(q˜j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
temporary
(5)
where νj ⊥⊥ Zk for all j, k. No distributional assumptions are made on the
ν’s or Z’s beyond their support, mean, and variance.
7The decaying term is nearly equivalent to that in the model of Obizhaeva and Wang
(2006) and allows for price impact which dissipates after trading a parent order.
PERFORMANCE METRICS FOR ALGORITHMIC TRADERS 15
These allow us to compute the bin VWAP and post-trade period VWAP:
pˇj = p0 +
j∑
k=1
[
σp,kZk + piq˜k + δ
j+1−kq˜k
]
+ q˜j
τ
|q˜j |
tj
+ φ
Vj
,(6)
pˇ+ = p0 + piq˜ +
n∑
j=1
Dj,+(σp,jZj + δ
j
n∑
k=1
δn+1−kq˜k︸ ︷︷ ︸
decaying impact
).(7)
4.3. Analyzing Parent Order Metrics. We analyze the parent order
metrics along with the realized implementation shortfall for comparison.
To do this, we assume a probability triple at any time t (Ω,Ft,P) with
Ft’s encapsulating all information known at time t. This yields the results
in Table 2. We next make some assumptions about bin lengths and the
volume distribution to simplify the full equations and gain insight into the
price impact model parameters.
Metric E(·) Var(·)
IL|F− q(p0 − p−) = 0 q2σ2p(t0 − t−)
RIS|F0
∑n
j=1
∑j
k=1
[
piq˜j q˜k
q˜ +
δj+1−k q˜j q˜k
q˜
] ∑n
j=1
(∑n
k=j σp,kq˜k
)2
+ τq˜
∑n
j=1
q˜2j
tj
+ φ sgn(q˜j)
II|F0 pi
∑n
j=1
∑n
k=j+1
q˜j q˜k
q˜
∑n−1
j=1
(∑j
k=1 σp,kq˜k
)2
+δ
∑n
j=1
[
δn−j q˜j −
∑j
k=1
δj−k q˜j q˜k
q˜
]
− τq˜
∑n
j=1 q˜
2
j /tj − φ sgn(q˜j)
AS|F0
∑n
j=1
∑j
k=1
[
piq˜j q˜k
q˜ +
δj+1−k q˜j q˜k
q˜
] ∑n
j=2
(∑j−1
k=1 σp,kq˜k
)2
+ τq˜
∑n
j=1 q˜
2
j /tj + φ sgn(q˜j)− piq˜ +q˜2
∑n
j=1
(∑n
k=j σp,kD¯k
)2
−∑nj=1 δjD¯j∑nk=1 δn+1−kq˜k
DI|FT
∑n
k=1 δ
n+1−kq˜k
(
1−∑nj=1 δjD¯j) q˜2∑nj=1 (∑nk=j σp,kD¯k)2
PI|F0 piq˜ +
∑n
k=1 δ
n+1−kq˜k
∑n
j=1 δ
jD¯j q˜
2
∑n
j=1
(∑n
k=j σp,kD¯k
)2
+q˜2σ2p
Table 2. Parent order metric expectations and variances.
The summations are over n child orders.
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We define time bins (via tj ’s) so all q˜j = q˜/n. (We assume this makes
σp,j = σp/
√
n to first order.) This simplifies the formulæ for realized imple-
mentation shortfall and incremental impact (RIS and II). If the expected
volume distribution is non-degenerate, we can also simplify the AS, DI, and
PI formulæ.8 The results of these simplifications are shown in Table 3.
Metric E(·) Var(·)
RIS|F0 piq˜ n+12n + q˜δn(1−δ) + τ q˜n2
∑n
j=1
1
tj
+ φ sgn(q˜j) σ
2
p q˜
2 5n2+6n+7
6n2
II|F0 piq˜ n−12n − τ q˜n2
∑n
j=1
1
tj
− φ sgn(q˜j) σ2p q˜2 (n−1)(2n−1)6n2
DI|FT q˜δn(1−δ) σ2p q˜2 5n
2+6n+7
6n2
PI|F0 piq˜ σ2p q˜2 11n
2+6n+7
6n2
AS|F0 q˜δn(1−δ) − piq˜ n+12n + τ q˜n2
∑n
j=1
1
tj
+ φ sgn(q˜j) σ
2
p q˜
2 2n2+4
3n2
Table 3. Simplified parent order metric expectations and
variances. Expectation approximations are of O(1/n2) where
n is the number of child orders.
4.4. Analyzing Intertemporal Metrics. Intertemporal metrics depend
heavily on the strategies for creating and executing orders. Some intertem-
poral metrics are, expectationally, covariances and relate expected changes
in market conditions, order placement strategies, and order decisions as men-
tioned in Lehmann (2003). With that in mind, we examine the intertemporal
metrics in light of the impact model.
Trading Shortfall (TS) is the quantity-weighted sum of the difference
between our bin average prices and the bin VWAPs:
E(TS|F0) =
n∑
j=1
q˜j
(
τ
|q˜j |
tj
+ φ
)(
1− |q˜j ||q˜j |+ µνj
)
,(8)
Var(TS|F0) =
n∑
j=1
q˜4j
(
τ
|q˜j |
tj
+ φ
)2 σ2νj
(|q˜j |+ µνj )4
.(9)
8Formally, we assume that D¯j = O(1/n) where n is the number of child orders.
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Trading shortfall is thus directly affected by temporary impact alone. This
corroborates findings by Heston et al. (2010).
Fill Time Shortfall (FTS) measures the cost of our orders being filled at
times different from when we send them:
E(FTS|F0) = q˜Cov(q˜·/q˜ − q·/q, pˇ·),(10)
Var(FTS|F0) =
n∑
k=1
(
n∑
j=k
σp,k(q˜j − q˜ qj
q
)
)2
+
n∑
j=1
(q˜j − q˜ qj
q
)2(τ
|q˜j |
tj
+ φ)2q˜2j
σ2νj
(µνj + |q˜j |)4
.
(11)
The expectation of fill time shortfall yields the relation between divergence
from an execution schedule and better prices. A positive covariance would
imply a tendency to have orders filled when prices are disadvantageous.
Order Timing Shortfall (OTS) measures the cost of sending orders ac-
cording to our desired schedule versus the average volume distribution:
E(OTS|F0) = q˜Cov(q·/q − D¯·, pˇ·),(12)
Var(OTS|F0) = q˜2
n∑
k=1
(
n∑
j=k
σp,j(
qj
q
− D¯j)
)2
+ q˜2
n∑
j=1
(
qj
q
− D¯j)2(τ |q˜j |
tj
+ φ)2q˜2j
σ2νj
(µνj + |q˜j |)4
.
(13)
The expectation of order timing shortfall is the covariance between prices
and the divergence of our planned execution schedule from the actual volume
distribution. A positive covariance implies a tendency to send orders when
prices are disadvantageous versus sending orders in line with trading volume.
The last two intertemporal metrics do not measure performance. The Vol-
ume Shortfall (V S) measures the cost due to divergence between the actual
and average volume distribution. If we take expectations, we may write it
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as the covariance between prices and differences of the realized and average
volume distribution. This term is random noise in the volume distribution
(hence Var(V S) is omitted). The Perfect VWAP Shortfall (PV S) measures
the cost of a VWAP benchmark versus the benchmark we instead chose.
This metric is merely needed for definition of the other decompositions.
4.5. Recovering the Price Impact Parameters. Using two parent order
metrics and the trading shortfall, we can recover the price impact model
parameters.
The permanent impact (PI) and decaying impact (DI) allow us to re-
cover the permanent pi and decaying δ parameters by linear and nonlinear
regressions of PI and DI on executed quantities:
PI = β0,P I + piq˜ + (14)
DI = β0,DI +
δ
1− δ
q˜
n
+ .(15)
The O(1/n2) bias terms in the PI and DI equations should be small for
parent orders split into many child orders (i.e. n large). If we split orders
into differing numbers of n child orders, we can add the O(1/n2) terms to
the above regressions to correct for biases.9
We recover the temporary (τ, φ) parameters by linear regression of bin
trading shortfalls on bin executed quantities scaled by the fractions of bin
volume not due to our trading:
TSj = β0,TS + τ
q˜j |q˜j |
tj
(
1− |q˜j |
Vj
)
+ φq˜j
(
1− |q˜j |
Vj
)
+ .(16)
The β0 intercepts are nuisance parameters to correct for imbalances in
the data. No further intuition into the β0’s is warranted.
9Without varying n, we cannot identify the intercept versus the bias terms.
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5. Interpretation: Beyond the Counterfactuals
The preceding analysis illustrates the value of these metrics. We can
also answer questions beyond the counterfactuals which led to the metrics.
Finally, we can also consider to what extent the various metrics may be
gamed. This is critical if we are measuring external managers or traders.
The realized implementation shortfall is well-covered in Perold (1988)
and others. Worth noting, however, is that RIS depends on all three types
of price impact: permanent, decaying, and temporary. Since permanent
price impact is inescapable (by definition), IS is not a clean optimizable
measure of trading performance. Furthermore, the unrealized portion of the
implementation shortfall values unfilled shares at a price from one point in
time — often the end of trading. This makes the implementation shortfall
especially easy to game.
5.1. Interpreting Parent Order Metrics. Information leakage (IL) mea-
sures the cost of price drift from when we reveal order information to when
trading starts. Since portfolio orders may be submitted to multiple agents
to solicit execution pricing, the possibility for front-running exists.10 If the
IL were large, we might suspect front-running or “pre-hedging” of our order.
The expectation and variance under the null hypothesis of no information
leakage yield a sensible t-test for unusual price drift:
t =
sgn(q)(p0 − p−)
σp
√
t0 − t− ,(17)
with rejection suggesting front-running. To increase the test power, we could
look at this statistic on a portfolio order level. The test can be gamed by
claiming that trading started earlier than it actually did. Test failure is
10Bid submissions for portfolio orders may list standard metrics along with a few of the
instruments to be traded. Those characteristics may allow partial inference of the portfolio
order. Lucchetti (2005) describes these issues in greater depth.
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not evidence of front-running. However, it suggests further examination —
especially if some order information is revealed prior to trading.
The incremental impact (II) metric measures how far prices were pushed
beyond our average execution price. A high II might attract more traders
providing liquidity (by taking the opposite side of our trading) — since a
high II implies a rapid and recent change in price. A high II might also
suggest the final orders were traded too aggressively and should have been
spread over a longer time or that order completion should not have been
mandated.
The decaying impact (DI) metric measures cumulated decaying price
impact which depends on the order schedule. Consistently higher or lower
DI metrics indicate poor or excellent scheduling of child orders. A high DI
might also suggest a parent order was traded over too short a time period.
Since II and DI refer to prices at trading end, they can be gamed to
look artificially small by ceasing trading prior to the reported stop time.
This means II and DI are suitable for internal use but should not be used
to measure external traders unless the manager sees all executions with
timestamps and knows all were traded in the market. Even traders unaware
of these metrics might distort them unknowingly. For example, broker-
dealers who provide liquidity at the end of trading effectively stop trading
early; they reduce II and DI in attempting to profit from price reversion.
The permanent impact (PI) metric measures total permanent price im-
pact which is linear in the total quantity traded and is the change in equi-
librium price due to economic information in the order. This suggests PI is
unaffected by skill and should be fairly consistent over time.
The adverse selection (AS) metric measures some permanent as well as
decaying and temporary impact. Since classic microstructure models im-
pound fears of adverse selection into price impact, the composition of AS
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should come as no surprise. Costs beyond permanent impact suggest how
much execution suffered due to adverse selection. This could include costs
for execution immediacy, front-running beyond the pricing (pre-trade) pe-
riod, and trading against others with superior information.
Gaming the PI and AS metrics is more difficult since they do not refer
to prices from one moment in time. However, as with II and DI, liquidity
provision can skew PI and AS. For example, a broker providing liquidity at
trading period end and exiting that position in the following period essen-
tially shifts the last part of trading to the next period. Liquidity provision
biases the next period’s VWAP to make PI appear larger and AS appear
smaller. (This may also slightly reduce IS.)
For a parent order metric focused on optimizable aspects of trading, we
can examine AS+PI2 (1+1/n). This yields a metric wholly based on decaying
and temporary impact — factors we can control through effective order
scheduling and trading acumen. However, the intuition behind this metric
is not clear nor is it immune from gaming: liquidity provision by an external
broker would reduce this metric, albeit less so than for either AS or PI alone.
5.2. Interpreting Intertemporal Metrics. Intertemporal metrics allow
us to distinguish between skill at executing trades, being suitably patient, or
scheduling child orders. If we can purchase these individual skills separately,
these metrics let us evaluate different managers for each task.
Trading shortfall is a function of temporary impact and, therefore, the
rate of trading q˜j/tj . A skilled trader probably adapts the rate of trading
to market conditions and should have a consistently small trading shortfall.
This small trading shortfall should be consistent across instruments, dates,
and intraday. Similarly, a trader who is disciplined but poor at execution
should have a consistently large trading shortfall.
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A trader who is neither disciplined nor skilled at execution should have
a noisy and inconsistent trading shortfall. This is crucial to discern: un-
predictability yields more orders filled at both poor and excellent prices.
Orders filled at excellent prices give inconsistent traders stories of seemingly
superior execution. These stories may sound convincing; but, with these
metrics, the lack of skill is apparent.
We can render TS uninformative by being all or none of the volume in a
bin: that bin’s trading shortfall is then 0. If we are most of the bin volume,
the shortfall will be close to 0. Very poor traders can mask their lack of
skill by only trading heavily at illiquid times. This would likely yield a poor
implementation shortfall but a small trading shortfall. Barring such blatant
manipulation, this metric should be valid for external use.
Trading shortfall also lets us extend the idea of information leakage to
the period during trading. If a front-runner is averse to liquidity risk, a
natural strategy is to front-run earlier in the period and exit the accumulated
position later in the period. This realizes profits and reduces liquidity risk
by trading against known liquidity (the remainder of the order).
The front-runner’s inventory accumulation and liquidation distorts our
executions versus fair prices. An order front-run in this manner should
exhibit large positive trading shortfalls in the beginning of the trading period
and small or negative trading shortfalls in the end of the trading period.
We can test if the shortfall pattern merits further attention by sorting
shortfalls and counting the number b in the worst half of performance and
the first half-trading period. The probability of b such “losing bins” is
P (b of worst half in first half-period) =
(
n/2
b
)
1
2n/2
.(18)
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A trader who places limit orders provides liquidity to the market and
sacrifices execution immediacy. A superior ability to be properly patient (a
“cool hand”) should yield a consistently negative fill time shortfall.
Overly passive traders are likely to receive superior prices for low amounts
early in the trading period and inferior prices later as they (aggressively)
“catch up” to the desired fill schedule. Thus overly passive traders should
have negative fill time shortfalls in earlier time bins and positive fill time
shortfalls in later bins. More sophisticated over-passive trader might “catch
up” periodically. If the order schedule is specified before trading, the fill
time shortfall should be valid for external use.
A trader who schedules child orders to achieve the lowest average execu-
tion cost should have a consistently small order timing shortfall. Traders
with a consistently large order timing shortfall should examine their sched-
uling of child orders. If the child order schedule is designed to match the
average volume D¯j , then the order timing shortfall is zero and cannot be
taken as informative. This metric may be used externally so long as the
child order schedule is not specified after trading.
A trader with a superior ability to predict the divergences from the aver-
age volume distribution should have a consistently small or negative volume
shortfall. However, these divergences are often caused by unpredictable
events such as news and large orders. This makes the volume shortfall noisy
and suggests separating it from the other metrics. Lacking an ability to
prediction these divergences, we should interpret this metric as noise.
6. Example Analysis
To clearly show the value of these metrics, we analyze two streams of
orders and trades. We choose a ten-bin day with each bin encompassing,
on average, 10% of the daily share volume. Prices are simulated with price
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impact as in Section 4.2 due to buying and selling noise traders. Price impact
also occurs due to two strategic traders who split their net buy orders to
execute them over the day.
The example day is shown in Table 4. We can then see how the two
different traders perform across this day. While amounts that differ by
one share are unusual, we can merely consider these to be the number of
100-share lots traded with results differing only by a common constant of
proportionality.
Day 1 Day 1 Day 1 Day 2 Day 2 Day 2
Bin (j) Buy Sell VWAP Buy Sell VWAP
1 2,262 590 20.00288 2,290 4,387 19.97238
2 1,286 1,808 20.00508 1,165 1,149 19.97101
3 423 941 20.00323 5,084 3,811 19.97435
4 1,233 495 20.00503 5,468 7,697 19.97460
5 4,151 4,824 20.00462 2,432 1,756 19.97238
6 2,592 4,882 20.00091 3,919 4,131 19.97304
7 1,703 10,050 19.98758 270 2,604 19.97080
8 657 1,010 19.96862 1,574 3,368 19.96391
9 174 1,146 19.97139 2,215 1,137 19.96402
10 1,533 1,785 19.97230 3,682 1,306 19.97067
Table 4. Noise buying, noise selling, and volume-weighted
average prices (VWAPs) for ten time bins/day of trading.
On average, each bin contains D¯ = 10% of the day’s volume.
Next we consider the actions of our two traders who trade on day 1
(Table 5). Trader A hews closely to the given order schedule with some
mild “front-loading” (ordering more earlier). Trader B deviates aggressively
in an attempt to achieve better execution prices. Both are constrained to
fill the order in the ten periods.
We then calculate volumes (noise buy + noise sell + trader A buy + trader
B buy), average prices, and the day’s VWAP. We get that trader A’s average
price was $20.00416 and trader B’s average price was $20.00234. The day
1 VWAP was $19.99443 and the day 2 VWAP was $19.97181. From these
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Trader A Average Trader B Average
Bin (j) Orders Buys Price A Orders Buys Price B
1 130 130 20.01878 100 80 20.01444
2 125 120 20.00823 100 85 20.00678
3 120 125 20.01443 100 95 20.01219
4 115 105 20.01274 100 85 20.00669
5 110 115 20.01825 100 95 20.01744
6 100 100 20.00664 100 100 20.00247
7 90 95 19.99240 100 100 19.98409
8 80 75 19.97687 100 110 19.96689
9 70 75 19.97998 100 115 19.97636
10 60 60 19.97970 100 135 19.97726
Table 5. Trader A and B’s orders, buys, and average prices
for ten time bins on day 1. Trader A and B each purchase
1,000 shares over the ten periods. Trader B’s orders are as
per the average volume distribution (constant at D¯ = 10%).
we compute parent order metrics. These metrics (Table 6) show that trader
B has a lower implementation shortfall than trader A. Most analyses would
conclude that trader B is more skilled than trader A. However, trader A has
lower incremental and decaying impact than trader B, suggesting trader B
was more aggressive at the end of day 1.
Trader IS II DI AS PI
A $4.16 -$24.46 $7.89 $32.35 -$28.19
B $2.34 -$17.08 $13.45 $30.53 -$28.19
Table 6. Trader A and B’s parent order metrics (per share)
for ten time bins of trading in day 1 and ten time bins without
their trading in day 2.
We can get more information if we use the trade data to compute the
intertemporal metrics. In that case, we see where each trader is better and
worse. Table 7 shows that trader A traded slightly better than trader B
(TSA < TSB), that trader B was a better short-term market timer than
trader A (FTSB < FTSA), and that trader B is a better order scheduler
that trader A (OTSB < OTSA). Therefore, if we could split their duties,
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we might prefer to have trader B schedule orders, trader A trade the order
split according to that schedule, and trader B to advise trader A on when
to be patient with short-term market conditions.
Trader A Trader B
Bin (j) TSAj FTS
A
j OTS
A
j TS
B
j FTS
B
j OTS
B
j V Sj
1 1.42 0.00 600.09 0.92 -400.06 0.00 1427.85
2 -0.22 -100.03 500.13 0.14 -300.08 0.00 1383.62
3 0.77 100.02 400.06 0.85 -100.02 0.00 1704.12
4 0.29 -200.05 300.08 0.14 -300.08 0.00 1641.89
5 0.99 100.02 200.05 1.22 -100.02 0.00 283.14
6 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 565.48
7 -0.02 99.94 -199.88 -0.35 0.00 0.00 -233.47
8 0.24 -99.84 -399.37 -0.19 199.69 0.00 1651.32
9 0.27 99.86 -599.14 0.57 299.57 0.00 1715.42
10 0.14 0.00 -798.89 0.67 699.03 0.00 1341.44
Total 3.96 -0.08 3.12 4.14 -1.96 0.00 11480.80
Table 7. Trader A and B’s trading shortfalls, fill time short-
falls, and order time shortfalls along with the volume short-
falls (common to all traders) for ten time bins of trading.
Trader B’s orders are identical to the average volumed dis-
tribution which is constant at D¯ = 10%. Totals may differ
due to rounding.
If we regress trader A’s or trader B’s trading shortfalls on time, the slope
is not significant; however, the mean trading shortfalls are significantly dif-
ferent from zero for both traders. This suggests that they are not sloppy
traders but are disciplined. In this example, however, a t-test cannot reject
the null hypothesis that both traders possess similar skill at trading.
If we regress trader A’s order timing shortfall on time, the slope is highly
significant: -157.47 with t=8.8; trader A’s scheduling does better as the day
progresses. This suggests trader A might want to shift some trading from
the start of the day to the end. If we regress trader B’s fill time shortfall
on time, the slope is highly significant: 100.53 with t=6.8; trader B’s short-
term market timing skill decreases as the day wears on. Thus trader B might
want to limit market timing to the start of the trading day.
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Finally, we can note that the volume shortfall numbers dominate the other
metrics. This is because they are noise; and, their relative size shows the
noise reducing powers of these intertemporal performance metrics.
7. Conclusion
We have introduced metrics to augment the implementation shortfall.
These metrics offer more information for specialized applications, have sen-
sible and intuitive interpretations, and are based on parent and child orders.
Some metrics may be gamed and should only be used for internal perfor-
mance evaluation; others resist gaming and may be used to evaluate the
performance of external execution providers.
Gameable metrics can help in optimizing internal trading processes to
reduce execution costs. Gaming-resistant metrics can help money managers
reduce trading costs by choosing algorithmic trading software or external
traders which perform best at various skills. These metrics could also reveal
changes in those skills. In particular, intertemporal (child order) metrics let
us measure skills at execution, short-term market timing, and child order
scheduling. By examining the significance of these metrics, we can test if a
trader is sloppy or undisciplined in one of these areas or if two traders have
statistically discernable differences in skills. We can also measure how these
metrics vary with market conditions and time. While we assume no model
for such variation, we can still discern significant correlations between these
skills and advantageous prices. These correlations (or linear regressions of
shortfalls) may offer guidance as to how we can improve our overall per-
formance. The time trends of these metrics can also help detect the times
when a trader’s skill is strongest and traders who are overly passive.
Some metrics have clear relations to a price impact model with lasting and
various types of ephemeral price impact. Researchers may estimate these
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model parameters with the help of these metrics. Those parameters may
help traders to lower execution costs and academics to compare execution
quality across time or markets. Other metrics suggest basic tests of whether
someone is front-running or “trading alongside” our order.
Simulations suggest use of these metrics could yield savings of about 2
basis points per trade for both trading and order scheduling skills. For
typical turnover figures, a typical fund could save 13 basis points per year.
That amounts to almost a 15% reduction in expenses and, for US-domiciled
equity mutual funds alone, a savings of $7.3 billion annually. Were we to
consider international equity funds, bond funds, pension funds, and insur-
ance companies, the savings would be much larger.
Better execution also benefits the market overall. Hendershott et al.
(2011) show that increasing use of algorithmic trading has narrowed spreads,
reduced adverse selection, reduced trade-related price discovery and thus has
improved liquidity and made quotes more informative. Easley and O’Hara
(2010) note that the benefits of algorithmic trading may also increase in-
vestor participation in the market and lower the cost of capital for firms
accessing the capital markets. We would expect this to also increase alloca-
tive efficiency since risk capital can seek out ventures with less frictions.
Therefore, helping firms to trade better should benefit actors in both the
primary and secondary markets.
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